After the historic Assembly of Guáimaro, the Spanish military command established new campaign plans with the aim of trying to paralyze the offensive carried out by the forces in Camagüey. And to prevent it, the Cuban side appointed Major Ignacio Agramonte as head of the Third Military Department on April 26th.

At that time, President Carlos Manuel de Céspedes was convinced that the leader of Camagüey had more than enough skills to carry out such a task. The foregoing proves that the leader from Bayamo, older and with more experience than Agramonte, understood the importance of the caudillo-Revolution relationship necessary in these circumstances of the war to unite around him the regional clientele of national projection.

Furthermore, Céspedes also knew this, it was the second and main geographic space to enter into armed conflict with the powerful adversary. Knowing this as well, the Major formed the cavalry to prevent the Spanish forces from wandering through the Camagüey plain and moving to the East.

At the same time that strategy developed by Agramonte was decisive in leading the Revolution to the West.

According to the military division of April 14th, 1868, 4 brigades, a half brigade and the reserve were integrated into the Spanish general staff.

The rest of the groups covered intricate areas of the jurisdiction. Outlaws armed by the Army and the Police Corps under the command of Ildefonso Lomelino Carbaza, Francisco Ibargaray and other disreputable Spanish leaders, such as the murderer Colonel Francisco de Acosta y Albear, were linked to these forces.

Despite such combative disposition of the Spanish military command, Major Agramonte attacked with his men in his first action as head of Camagüey. That day, May 3rd, while the convoy made up of 3,000 Spanish reinforcement soldiers was moving along the Nuevitas-Puerto Principe railway, the containment and annihilation ambush strategically designed by Agramonte from the flanks of the railway paralyzed the enemy’s advance.

According to the dispatch addressed to the Secretary of War, the enemy had around 200 casualties.

The cavalry, without yet having the required training or experience, did not fully enter the action, as their horsemen took up positions on the ground to harass and annihilate the enemy with rifle fire. So the cavalry would be reserved for future actions, according to the concept of “guerrilla warfare” studied by El Mayor from General José de San Martín.

Such triumph of Camagüey forces surprised the Hispanic command. Meanwhile, the success of Ceja de Altagracia, near the rural town of the same name and 11 km from the city of Puerto Príncipe, multiplied the combative morale of the Major’s followers, and for whom more triumphs would await in the course of the war.

Translated by: Aileen Álvarez García